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Case No. 20060131-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals his convictions for one count each of burglary, a second 
degree felony, and theft, a Class A misdemeanor. This Court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004). 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Was evidence that a co-defendant implicated defendant in the burglary, 
and that defendant was attempting to start the stalled car containing stolen tools 
shortly after the burglary, sufficient to withstand a motion for directed verdict? 
Standard of Review. "In reviewing the denial of a motion for a directed 
verdict based on a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, '[this Court] will 
uphold the trial court's decision if, upon reviewing the evidence and all 
inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it, we conclude that some evidence 
exists from which a reasonable jury could find that the elements of the crime had 
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.'" State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, f^ 29, 84 
P.3d 1183 (quoting State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221,1225 (Utah 1989)). A trial court 
may deny a motion for directed verdict if, viewing the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the State, it "finds that the state has established a 'prima facie case 
against the defendant by producing believable evidence of all the elements of the 
crime charged/" Id. (quoting State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 784 (Utah 1992)) 
(additional quotation and citation omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Resolution of this case involves interpretation of the burglary and theft 
statutes, the relevant portions of which are reproduced below. 
Burglary. (1) An actor is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains 
unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building with intent to commit: 
(a) a felony; 
(b) theft; 
UTAH CODE A N N . § 76-6-202 (West 2004). 
Theft A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized 
control over the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
UTAH CODE A N N . § 76-6-404 (West 2004). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with one count each of burglary, a second 
degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-202, and theft, a Class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-404. R.l. At the close of 
the State's case, defendant moved for a directed verdict of acquittal on the 
ground that the evidence was insufficient. R.222:5-8. Defendant argued that the 
only evidence supporting his guilt was his co-defendant's out-of-court statement 
that the co-defendant denied at trial. R.222:8. The trial court denied the motion. 
R.222:20-23 (a copy of the trial court's oral ruling is included as Addendum A). 
A jury convicted defendant as charged. R.121. 
The trial court sentenced defendant to serve one to fifteen years in the 
Utah State Prison on the burglary conviction. R.153. However, the trial court 
suspended the prison sentence and placed defendant on probation for thirty-six 
months with several conditions, including that he serve 270 days in the Utah 
County Jail. R.155-54. The trial court imposed a ninety-five-day jail sentence on 
the theft conviction. R.154.1 
Defendant timely appealed. R.195. 
Defendant filed a timely motion for new trial alleging that he had 
obtained newly discovered evidence. R.159. The trial court denied that motion. 
R. 193-91. Defendant does not appeal that decision. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In June, 2004, Ethan Gale was driving through his Provo neighborhood on 
his way home. R.223:17-18. As he passed his neighbor's house, he became 
suspicious of a gold car parked in front of his neighbor's driveway. R.223;17-18. 
Gale observed someone carry some bulky items out of his neighbor's garage and 
throw the items into the back seat of the gold car. R.223:18,19-20. Gale noticed 
two other persons in the front seat of the car. R.223: 18-19. Gale watched as the 
person who carried the items from the garage jumped into the back seat of the 
car and the car sped off with that person's legs still hanging out of the open car 
door. R.223:18-20. 
Gale described the individuals as "younger kids," but did not get a good 
look at their faces. R.223:21. Suspecting that he had just witnessed a burglary, 
Gale followed the gold car for about two minutes until it stopped at an 
apartment complex. R.223:20, 21. Gale then went to a nearby gas station and 
called police. R.223:20. While waiting for police to arrive, Gale drove back past 
the gold car and noticed that the three individuals were no longer in the car. 
R.223:22-23. He assumed that they had gone into the apartment complex. 
R.223:22-23. 
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Meanwhile, Nick Bandley was walking up his parent's driveway when he 
heard someone holler from two or three houses away asking if he could help 
jump-start a car. R.223:27, 29. Police later discovered that it was the same car 
that had been used in the burglary. R.223:71-73. As Bandley approached the car 
he saw defendant and another male. R.223:28, 30. A third male joined the group 
after Bandley arrived. R.223:28, 30. Bandley and the others tried to start the car 
without success. R.223:28. Eventually, Bandley offered to give the three a ride, 
and they directed him to a home in Springville. R.223:28. 
A short while later, Officer Hubbard arrived at the stalled car and 
interviewed Ethan Gale. R.223:71-72. Officer Hubbard looked inside the car and 
saw what he believed to be stolen tools in the back seat. R.223:72-73. He then 
organized other officers to watch the car to see if any suspects returned. 
R.223:72-73. 
When Bandley returned from dropping off the three males in Springville, 
he noticed several police cars surrounding the car he had been trying to help 
jump-start. R.223:31-32. When Officer Hubbard approached Bandley and asked 
him if he knew anything about the car, Bandley explained that he had just given 
a ride to three people who had been trying to start the car. R.223:32. Bandley 
was "a hundred percent positive" that defendant was one of the three who had 
been trying to start the car. R.223:33. 
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"[A]n hour or two" after the burglary, an officer saw a suspicious car 
approach the stalled car with the stolen tools inside. R.223:53, 75. A female was 
driving the car, defendant was in the back seat, and his friend, Justin Broderick 
was in the front passenger seat. R.223:75, 76, 78, 82. 
Officer Hubbard stopped the car and questioned the occupants. R.223:75-
76. Broderick told Officer Hubbard that he and his friends were driving around 
Provo when defendant told him to stop in front of a house. R.223:83. Broderick 
explained that defendant then went into the garage and took some items. 
R.223:84,118. Broderick also admitted that he had a drug problem, that he was 
stealing things to obtain money for drugs, and that he had warrants for his 
arrest. R.223:84. Officer Hubbard then questioned the other suspects. R.223:84-
85. 
Officer Hubbard again spoke with Broderick and asked him to fill out a 
written statement. R.223:84. During this second conversation, Officer Hubbard 
asked Broderick, "[W]ho took the items from the garage?" R.223:85. Broderick 
again responded that it was defendant. R.223:85, 96-98,118. Broderick's written 
statement included his admission that "driv[]ing in Provo my friend got out and 
took some st[uff] from a g[a]ra[]ge." R.223:49-50; State's Exhibit 2 (contained in 
an unpaginated manila envelope). Officers recovered a Dewalt sliding 
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compound miter saw and a Craftsman compressor set from the stalled car. 
R.223:37. 
At trial, Broderick testified that he grew up in Springville with defendant 
and that he considers defendant to be a "[p]retty good friend/' R.223:47. 
Broderick admitted that he was driving a car in Provo on 6 June 2004 and that 
the car broke down. R.223:48. He admitted that defendant was with him later 
that day, but could not remember whether defendant was with him when his car 
broke down. R.223:48. He also admitted that the stolen items were found in his 
car. R.223:52. Broderick confirmed that he was the one driving the car; however, 
he also testified that he was the one who ran into the garage and stole the tools. 
R.223:52. Broderick denied having told Officer Hubbard that defendant was the 
one who stole the tools. R.223:50-51. 
By the time of defendant's trial, Broderick had pleaded guilty to burglary 
and theft based on the same facts in defendant's case. R.223:49, 55,120-21. The 
factual basis in Broderick's plea affidavit originally stated that "On June 6, 2004, 
Justin Broderick was the driver of a vehicle that was used to commit a burglary 
of a residence in Utah County. Justin drove the car while his friend, Brady 
Hamilton, ran into a garage and took a $600 compound miter saw and a 
craftsman air compressor." State's Exhibit 3 at 2, contained in a unpaginated 
manila envelope. However, the words "his friend, Brady Hamilton," were 
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crossed out and the words, "another individual/' were written in the margin. Id. 
Broderick testified at defendant's trial that he had insisted that defendant's name 
be removed from the plea affidavit and that he refused to plead guilty otherwise. 
R.223-.56. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The evidence was sufficient to send the case to the jury because the State's 
case was not based entirely on Broderick's out-of court statement to Officer 
Hubbard implicating defendant. Rather, the State also presented evidence that, 
shortly after the burglary, defendant, Broderick, and another male, were 
attempting to start the stalled car containing the stolen tools in the back seat. The 
State's evidence also demonstrated that, within two hours of the burglary, 
defendant and Broderick returned again to the stalled car containing the stolen 
tools. Viewed together, and in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict, this 
evidence was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of burglary and theft. 
ARGUMENT 
THE CO-DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT AND DEFENDANT'S 
CONNECTION TO THE CAR CONTAINING THE STOLEN 
TOOLS ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE CASE THAT 
DEFENDANT COMMITTED BURGLARY AND THEFT 
Defendant claims that the trial court erroneously denied his motion for a 
directed verdict because the only evidence of his guilt was Broderick's unsworn 
statement to police that Broderick ultimately denied at trial. Br. Aplt. at 9. 
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However, the trial court correctly found that when evidence of defendant's 
connection to the car containing the stolen tools was considered with Broderick's 
statement, the evidence established a prima facie case that defendant had 
committed burglary and theft. R.222: 20-23 (Add. A). 
"In reviewing the denial of a motion for a directed verdict based on a claim 
of insufficiency of the evidence, '[this Court] will uphold the trial court's decision 
if, upon reviewing the evidence and all inferences that can be reasonably drawn 
from it, we conclude that some evidence exists from which a reasonable jury 
could find that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt/" State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, \ 29, 84 P.3d 1183 (quoting State v. Dibello, 
780 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah 1989)). A trial court may deny a motion for directed 
verdict if, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, it "finds 
that the state has established a 'prima facie case against the defendant by 
producing believable evidence of all the elements of the crime charged.'" Id. 
(quoting State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 784 (Utah 1992)) (additional quotation and 
citation omitted). 
Broderick told Officer Hubbard that defendant was the one who ran into 
the garage and stole the tools. R.223:84-85, 96-98,118. However, after pleading 
guilty himself, Broderick denied making the statement and testified at 
defendant's trial that he was the one who ran into the garage and stole the tools. 
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R.223:50-51. Broderick also testified that he was driving the car when the tools 
were stolen from the garage. R.223:52. 
"[A] conviction that is based entirely on a single, uncorroborated hearsay 
out-of-court statement that is denied by the declarant in court under oath cannot 
stand/7 State v. Ramsey, 782 P.2d 480, 484 (Utah 1989). Thus, if Broderick's 
statement had been the only evidence of defendant's guilt, the State would not 
have established a prima facie case against defendant. 
However, the State's case was not "based entirely" on Broderick's 
statement. See id. Rather, the State also presented evidence that, shortly after the 
burglary, defendant and Broderick jointly enlisted Nick Bandley's help to try and 
jump-start the car containing the stolen tools. R.28, 30. The stolen tools were in 
plain view in the back seat of the car. R.223:72-73. The evidence also 
demonstrated that defendant and Broderick returned to the car containing the 
stolen tools within two hours of the burglary. R.223:53, 75, 76, 78, 82. 
Defendant responds that "'mere presence with the perpetrators of the 
substantive crime is insufficient to support a conviction.'" Aplt. Br. at 12 
(quoting United States v. Summers, 414 R3d 1287,1294 (10th Cir. 2005)). However, 
defendant's connection to the car containing the stolen tools was not the only 
evidence of defendant's guilt. The jury also heard evidence of Broderick's 
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admission to police that defendant was the one who ran into the garage and stole 
the tools. R.223:84-85, 96-98,118. 
Defendant's claim fails because he analyzes each piece of evidence in 
isolation. However, the trial court properly considered the entirety of '"the 
evidence, and all inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it7" in denying 
defendant's motion for directed verdict. See Montoya, 2004 UT 5 at \ 9 (quoting 
Dibello, 780 P.2d at 1225). Neither Broderick's statement to police, nor 
defendant's connection to the car with the stolen tools, would alone be sufficient 
to establish a prima facie case against defendant. However, when viewed 
together, this evidence suffices. 
A person commits burglary if he "enters or remains unlawfully in a 
building or any portion of a building with intent to commit . . . theft." UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-6-202(l)(b) (West 2004). "A person commits theft if he obtains 
or exercises unauthorized control over the property of another with a purpose to 
deprive him thereof." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-404 (West 2004). 
Properly viewed as a whole, the evidence was sufficient to justify sending 
the case to the jury. Broderick told police that defendant was the one who ran 
into the garage and stole the tools. R.223:84-85, 96-98, 118. Shortly after the 
burglary, defendant was trying to start the stalled car containing the stolen tools 
and he again returned to that car within two hours of the burglary. R.191, 
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223:27-30, 75, 76, 78, 82. The victim also testified that neither defendant nor 
Broderick had his permission to take his tools. R.223:41-42. These facts 
constituted "'some evidence . . . from which a reasonable jury could find that the 
elements of [burglary and theft] had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt /" 
See Montoya, 2004 UT 5 at \ 29 (quoting Dibello, 780 P.2d at 1225). 
Defendant argues that "the evidence was unequivocal that only one 
person went into the garage and took the tools — and Broderick [both] testified 
under oath that he was that person [and] pled guilty to having done so." Br. 
Aplt. at 10. However, Broderick's attempt to accept full responsibility for the 
crime lacked credibility. Broderick testified that he both drove the car used in 
the burglary, and was the individual who ran into the garage to steal the tools. 
R.223:52. But an eyewitness, Ethan Gale, testified that the person who had stolen 
the tools jumped into the backseat of the car and that the car sped off with that 
person's legs still hanging out of the open rear door. R.223:18-20. Gale's 
testimony renders Broderick's account factually impossible. Therefore, viewed 
in a light most favorable to the State, Broderick's acceptance of full responsibility 
did not diminish the State's prima facie case against defendant. 
Defendant also complains that, in both his written and oral statements to 
police, Broderick never identified defendant by name as the person who ran into 
the garage and stole the tools. Br. Aplt. at 10. While Broderick did not use 
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defendant's name, Officer Hubbard explained that there was no confusion that 
Broderick identified defendant as the person who stole the tools from the garage. 
Defendant and Broderick returned to the stalled car containing the stolen 
tools in another car driven by a female. R.223:75, 76, 78, 82. Broderick was in 
the front seat of that car and defendant was in the back seat. R.223:75, 76, 78, 82. 
Officer Hubbard testified that he stopped that car and questioned Broderick 
while the two sat in his patrol car. R.75-76, 78. When he asked Broderick "[W]ho 
took the items from the garage?" Broderick replied, "Hamilton" (the defendant). 
R.223:85. 
On cross-examination, Officer Hubbard explained that Broderick never 
actually used defendant's name, but responded that it was "[t]he back seat 
passenger" who had stolen the items from the garage. R.223:96-97, 98, 104. 
However, Officer Hubbard further explained that when Broderick referred to 
"the backseat passenger," Officer Hubbard clarified the response by asking 
Broderick if he was referring to the backseat passenger in "[t]hat car right there, 
the one I just pulled over, the one we're parked right behind, that one right now, 
where there's a guy sitting in the back[?]" R.223:97. Broderick responded, "Yes." 
R.223:97. Therefore, although Broderick may not have identified defendant by 
name, there was no question that he was referring to defendant as the person 
who stole the items from the garage. 
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Taken together, and viewed in a light most favorable to the State, 
Broderick's statement, and the evidence of defendant's connection to the car 
containing the stolen tools, sufficed to send the case to the jury. See Montoya, 
2004 UT 5, f^ 29. Therefore, the trial court properly denied defendant's motion 
for a directed verdict. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should affirm defendant's convictions. 
Respectfully submitted If December 2006. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
CHRISTOPHER D. BALLARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Addendum A 
sole evidence, dismissal would be appropriate." 
They recognize this at the meetings. They recognize 
the problem and worry for prior inconsistent statements. They 
have no other direct evidence that Mr. Hamilton committed the 
crime. They're relying solely upon a prior inconsistent 
statement of a codefendant to convict Mr. Hamilton. And it's 
wrong. It should not be sent to a jury. We should not 
entrust -- this should stop now. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Anything else before I rule? 
In this case, I'm going to deny the motion for the 
directed verdict. There is sufficient evidence to allow the 
case to go to the jury. I'm going to recite that really 
briefly. 
True, we have an out-of-court statement. The only 
direct evidence of identification in this case - I'm saying 
direct rather than circumstantial evidence -- is the statement 
by Mr. Broderick where he identifies -- at least there's 
evidence that he identifies Mr. Hamilton as the one who went 
in the garage and took the DeWalt miter saw and the compressor 
out. 
Now, if that were uncorroborated by any 
circumstantial evidence, then I think the defense motion would 
be well taken because, like in the Ramsay case, that alleged 
out-of-court statement would be the only evidence that would 
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1 I support the conviction on that particular count. 
Where we're different from Ramsay is, on that 
particular count, there was no corroboration. The Court 
determined, in other words, the only evidence, uncorroborated 
or not, was the boy's out-of-court statement. Here we 
actually have quite a bit of corroboration which, if the jury 
believes it, could support a conviction beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
The evidence would be that the first witness, 
Mr. Gale, sees these three individuals in the car and sees one 
of them jump into the car, take off with his legs hanging out 
of the back seat, sees where the cars goes, reports it to the 
police. Admittedly, the car is out of his sight for probably 
about a half hour while he's at the service station. However, 
during that time, or shortly after that time, we have 
Mr. Bandley coming up to the car to help these three gentlemen 
jump their car and definitely recognizes Mr. Hamilton as being 
present. 
Now, this is fairly quickly after the alleged offense 
had occurred. You have this vehicle there within a fairly 
proximate time of when the offense occurred, perhaps as early 
as 15 to 30 minutes. Probably not more than that. And so you 
have that going on. You have an identification there, at 
least of this gentleman being in the area of this stolen 
property within a very proximate time to its having been 
21 

























Then, finally, we have the statement of Mr. Broderick 
given to the patrolman who is investigating this case, 
basically telling him that, yeah, this is the gentleman who 
went in the garage and took the property out. And Detective 
Hubbard has given him his Miranda warnings. He knows he's in 
trouble. He's making a statement, and then he comes in here 
and contradicts the statement. Nevertheless, he has made an 
out-of-court statement which is admissible under the rules of 
hearsay under a couple of rules for substantive purposes. So 
I think that that statement is corroborated. 
Even had it not been corroborated, the fact that 
Mr. Hamilton is with the property within less than an hour 
after it's taken and is associated with this vehicle less than 
an hour after it's taken I think would probably be 
circumstantial evidence that could even support a conviction 
on its own, being in the possession of recently stolen 
property. But we don't even have that circumstance here 
because we do have the statements being made and the 
corroboration. 
I think, based on that, there is substantial evidence 
that would justify the jury being able to determine 
credibility and weigh the evidence. When I say substantial 
evidence, I don't mean overwhelming evidence. I mean the 
legal definition of substantial evidence which would be 
CERTIFfkD 
allowed to go to a jury. On that basis, I'm going to deny the 
motion. I think the jury can consider this case and determine 
whether or not there is sufficient evidence to support a 
finding beyond a reasonable doubt. That will be the ruling of 
the Court. 
MR. LARSON: Thank you, Judge. 
THE COURT: Anything else? I think you preserved 
that issue. You even cited case authority. I think you've 
done a good job on the motion, Mr. Howell. Anything else that 
you wanted to bring up? 
MR. HOWELL: No, Judge. 
THE COURT: Are you ready to proceed with your case, 
then? 
MR. HOWELL: Just a second, Judge. 
(Counsel and Defendant confer off the record.) 
MR. HOWELL: Judge, the defense rests. 
THE COURT: What we could do, then, is go ahead and 
go through jury instructions. There may be some we need to 
add in light of the defense posture. We'll have to check. 
I'll let counsel decide. Do either of you think that it would 
be best to tell the jury that we're going to take a half hour 
or so to go through jury instructions? We'll have to go 
through them and copy them, which takes at least 15 minutes. 
Craig will have lots of copy machines involved, but it takes 
at least 15 minutes. 
TRANSCRIPT 23 
